Jimmy Carter's public statements surrounding the normalization of relations with China and Deng Xiaoping's subsequent visit also followed the trend of diplomatic talks between the United States and China in that they glossed over the institutional differences between the two countries. In the signing ceremony recognizing the establishment of Sino-American ties, Carter reiterated the strong historical background of the Sino-American relationship by referencing the Chinese-American population: \"Almost 700,000 American citizens trace their roots to China. There are strong bonds of blood kinship and history between the United States and China\" (Carter 1980, 1773). Moreover, Carter argued that the United States and China have been friends for many years. In remarks after announcing the intended treaty between China and the United States, Carter noted: \"the American and the Chinese people had a long history of friendship,\" which suggested that the Chinese should be seen as brothers and kin rather than as the enemy (Carter 1978, 2265).
In their public rhetoric, the situation is very different which reflects the difference in the independent variable. When China assisted the North Vietnamese Communists, then the United States consequently viewed China as an enemy. In this environment, Lyndon Johnson strategically employed ideological language and the dichotomization between freedom and communism to motivate the public against the Chinese communists. This facilitated U.S. foreign policy by encouraging the public to support any retaliatory acts the United States took against China. In the case of Jimmy Carter, the situation is very different. As China was now viewed as a friend, especially after the Sino-Soviet split and Nixon's visit to China, the public rhetoric of Jimmy Carter took a very different direction. Recognizing that Johnson's rhetoric paints a negative picture of China, Carter could not only ignore the ideological differences between the U.S. and China, but he had to cast them in a new light. This necessity led him to emphasize the fact that the ideological differences between the two countries can be a source of strength rather than weakness. While this is the exact opposite reaction of President Johnson, the motives are the same throughout: they are both using ideological rhetoric to influence the mindsets of their constituents to support their policies. As a result, Constructivist argument that ideological influences impact foreign policy decisions of decision makers seems to not hold. Moreover, this portrayal of relations in an ideological suggests that the policymakers did not have autonomy in foreign policy making, but instead were limited by the nonstrategic thinking of their constituents, which trends against the neorealist explanation. In comparison, the neoclassical realist perspective that the government focused on geopolitical aims while the president used ideology to motivate the masses to support the government seems to hold true.
A second alternative explanation would be the underlying nature of the independent variable in my research, which is the perception of China as either a friend or an enemy. Throughout this analysis, I took as given that during the Johnson administration the administration viewed China as an enemy. I based this conceptualization on the fact that the U.S. was currently engaged in the Vietnam War and the Chinese were assisting the other side. However, a key limitation to the argument that ideology does not have a noticeable impact on foreign policy is how exactly these perceptions of China as a friend or enemy came into being. One alternative explanation could be that the U.S. engaged in Vietnam for ideological reasons and the Chinese engaged in it for ideological reasons as well, and the U.S. officials formulating foreign policy were taking these ideologies as given and then formulating responses based on them. An alternative explanation would be that, in overt ways, the U.S. foreign policy makers did not take into consideration ideology, but in psychological, cultural, and societal ways they were shaped by the ideology of their time. Although the exceptionally few instances of foreign policymakers taking into consideration ideology when formulating policy argues against this theory, further research on the topic would be necessary to elucidate the influence of underlying societal and cultural perceptions on influencing foreign policy makers. Possible research could compare U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War in what is perceived as a very ideologically charged time period with a similar time period lacking the ideological language. If the realist argument is correct, the foreign policies should be exactly the same. If ideology does have an influence, then the foreign policies would differ.
Relations between the United States and China took a variety of different forms in the 20th century. From ally in World War II to enemy at the start of the Cold War and then back to friend at the end of the Cold War, a thorough analysis of Sino-American relations would be a tall order; however, my research on two select historical events from this time period suggests that the foreign policymakers prioritized strategy over ideology. By analyzing both the public and private rhetoric of the Johnson and Carter administrations, I tested two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that negative government rhetoric will be more pronounced when the U.S. viewed China as an enemy rather than as a friend. The presence of negative ideological rhetoric when viewed as an enemy and positive ideological rhetoric when viewed as a friend supports this hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that public statements will have more ideologically charged statements than private statements. Given the focus of the private statements on analyzing the technical and geopolitical implications of China and the focus on public statements for gaining support for U.S. foreign policy, the evidence supports this hypothesis as well. While the Cold War ideological divide between communism and capitalism appeared to fade out with the decline of the Soviet Union, a thorough understanding of the influence of ideology on foreign relations formulation and perceptions of foreign relations formulations, and the divide between the two, remains important to understand. This is because the ideological influences on foreign policy may still exist, but in less overt forms. The reality of present-day SinoAmerican relations is that China remains a communist power. Although numerous scholars and foreign policy analysts differ in how communist China actually is, understanding how ideology and perceptions of that ideology influence foreign policy is important for contemporary understanding of SinoAmerican relations.
Two cases in this Court from the Post-Revolutionary period, Respublica v. Sparhawk, and Black v. Rempublicam, are nonetheless read by some as adopting the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Sparhawk, the plaintiff sought to recover from the Comptroller General the value of goods seized during the Revolution by agents of the Commonwealth, acting upon direction of the Continental Congress. The goods had been seized to prevent them from falling into the hands of the British, but the enemy captured and used them anyway.
As section I, supra, establishes, Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary Pennsylvania was hostile to the notion that the Commonwealth should have the prerogatives of the English crown or that it should be immune from paying its just debts. For example, in 1782, before the end of the Revolutionary War, the Legislature passed a statute allowing all contract and bond claims against the Commonwealth to be presented for adjudication. Likewise, in the 1788 case of Respublica v. Sparhawk, this Court agreed that the plaintiffs' allegations would have alleged a trespass had the Commonwealth not been acting in wartime to keep goods out of the hands of the enemy. 59ce067264